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Review Articles

To Compare or Not to Compare?
Reading Justice Breyer
RUSSELL MILLER*
Justice Breyer's new book The Court and the World presents a number of productive
challenges.' First, it provides an opportunity to reflect generally on extra-judicial scholarly
activities. Second, it is a major and important - but also troubling - contribution to
debates about comparative law broadly, and the opening of domestic constitutional
regimes to external law and legal phenomena more specifically.
I want to begin by suggesting a critique of the first of these points. These are merely
some thoughts on the implications of extra-judicial scholarship. The greater portion of this
essay, however, is devoted to a reading of Justice Breyer's book, which is a compelling
manifesto supporting comparative law and, at the same time, a frustrating example of the
problems plaguing our project.
THOUGHTS ON EXTRA-JUDICIAL SCHOLARSHIP
There is a long tradition of judicial scholarship in the United States, most famously including
Justice Joseph Story (1779-1845) and his "magisterial" commentaries on the United States
Constitution.2 This practice is not unknown in Germany, the foreign jurisdiction that is
the focus of much of my research. For example, at least one prominent commentary on
the Basic Law bears the name of a former justice of the Federal Constitutional Court.'
Scores of former and current justices have written portions of prominent constitutional
law commentaries.4 In the United States extra-judicial scholarship is smiled upon for
the contribution it is supposed to make to the public's understanding of the law and
the edification of the judges who produce it.' Extra-judicial scholarship is permitted by

* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World (New York, Alfred Knopf, 2015).
2
See Jeffrery M. Shaman, "Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in the United States", in H. P. Lee (ed.),
Judiciaries in ComparativePerspective (2011), p. 519. See also Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitutionof the

United States (1833).
See Gerhard Leibholz, et al., Grundgesetzfilr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Kommentar; Rechtsprechung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts(69th ed.; 2015).
4 Peter Huber (a member of the Federal Constitutional Court Second Senate) has contributed, for example, to
the Michael Sachs commentary on the Basic Law. See, for example, Peter M. Huber, Pridambel, in Michael Sachs
(ed.), Grundgesetz Kommentar (7th ed. 2014), p. 21.
5
Shaman, note 2 above, p. 520. See also Jonathan Lippman, "The Judge and Extrajudicial Conduct", 33 Cardozo

Law Review, XXXIII (2012), pp. 1384-1386; Kenneth F. Ripple, "The Role of the Law Review in the Tradition of
Judicial Scholarship", New York UniversityAnnual Survey ofAmerican Law, LVII (2000), p. 444; Kenneth F. Ripple,

"Judges on Judging", Ohio State Law Journal, L (1989), p. 1241.
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the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and,6 in any case, is regarded as a form
of speech protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.' Judges'
scholarly activity allows them to enrich legal and political discourse from the deep well
of their professional - and particularly their judicial - expertise and experience. Jonathan
Lippman, a long-serving member of the New York Court of Appeals, urged a presumption
in favor of such extra-judicial activities, as long as care is taken not to create the perception
that the judge-scholar is prejudging a legal issue.' America's most productive and wellknown contemporary judge-scholar may be Richard A. Posner of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Judge Posner has written nearly thirty books and scores of
articles. He is a founding figure in the influential "law and economics" movement, a status
he earned with such foundational works as Economic Analysis of Law (1973), The Economics
of Justice (1981), and The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (2003). Judge Posner
has acknowledged that his extra-judicial scholarly activity is part of a deep tradition. He
seems to hope that his writing belongs to the better part of that tradition, which involves
work that is focused on judicial philosophy. 0 Judge Posner believes the more redeemable
efforts at extra-judicial scholarship, which he distinguishes from "academic" commentary,
can supplement academic literature in valuable ways." Indeed, he cites the extra-judicial
commentary of Justice Stephen Breyer as an example of this commendable practice.1 2
But Judge Posner has serious doubts about much extra-judicial writing. He dismisses it
as "propagandistic" because it seeks - in his view - to assure the public that judges are
hard-working, conscientious, and apolitical.' Judge Posner's critique implies that he has
reservations about these claims with respect to his fellow judges.
Curiously, extra-judicial scholarship has attracted more attention in the British
Commonwealth. These commentators share the typical concern that extra-judicial writing
can erode the perceived neutrality of the courts.1 4 One set of scholars concluded that
"extrajudicial writing amounts to prejudging and is bad".'" But the literature identifies
other problems. First, extra-judicial writing gives judges an inappropriate second chance
to re-explain or clarify their judicial writings.'6 This is inappropriate because not all judges
involved in a decision will take advantage of the opportunity to (re)publish their views
in this way. 7 Moreover, scholarship produced by judges will necessarily attract more
attention and will be regarded as more authoritative, simply because it has been written by

Canon 4(a)(1) provides that a "A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, including ... Speaking, Writing,
and Teaching. A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activities concerning the law,
the legal system, and the administration of justice".
7
See, for example, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
See Lippman, note 5 above.
Ibid.
o Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging(2013), pp. 10-12.
" Ibid.
6

12

Ibid.

Ibid.
See Jasmin Moran, "Courting Controversy: The Problems Caused by Extrajudicial Speech and Writing",
453
Victoria University Wellington Law Review, XLVI (2015), p.
1
See Susan Bartie and John Gava, "Some Problems with Extrajudicial Writing", Sydney Law Review, XXXIV
(2012), p. 639.
16
See Russell Smyth, "Judges and Academic Scholarship", Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice
Journal, 11 (2002), pp. 200-201.
13

.

14
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judges.'" These factors led one Canadian commentator to conclude that judges' efforts to
explain their decisions in extra-judicial scholarship "should be avoided like the plague". 1
Second, the critics note that the acceptance of extra-judicial scholarship depends on highly
positivistic and formalistic understandings of the judicial function that have long-ago
been rejected.20 Finally, the critics worry about the effect that extra-judicial writing has on
scholarly discourse, especially in light of evidence that suggests that "it is easier for judges
to publish their views than individuals who are not judges".2
There is evidence of these problems in Justice Breyer's new book, which is largely
devoted to accessible treatments of major Supreme Court cases, many of which he helped
to decide. Justice Breyer dissented from the majority judgment in many of these cases, and
he uses the book to offer a restatement of the views he expressed in his formal dissenting
opinions, sometimes accompanied by a narrative endorsement of his position or a critique
of the views of other opinion writers involved in the decision. In these moments Justice
Breyer willingly concedes the priority owed to the majority conclusions while nonetheless
taking the opportunity to explain or clarify his dissent. For example, when discussing the
Supreme Court's decision in Zivotofsky v. Clinton (2012),22 Justice Breyer explains that the
Court reached the merits of the case despite the lower court's conclusion that the case
involved an unreviewable "political question" .23 The Court was unanimous on this point,
except for a single dissenter. "I was the one", Justice Breyer dryly notes in a parenthetical. 24
But he gives the eight-justice majority's decision only two sentences. 25 Justice Breyer's
solitary dissent, in which he articulated how he "saw the case differently", merits a long
justificatory paragraph. 26 When discussing the Supreme Court decision in the Sanchez28
Llamas case,27 Justice Breyer offers an even-handed summary of the majority's reasoning.
It is clear from a latent tone of disapproval - perhaps fostered by the book's general
argument - that Justice Breyer disagreed with the outcome. This suspicion is confirmed
when he admits that he dissented in the case. That admission is followed by a recapitulation
of his dissenting arguments. 29 This is not a veiled or subtle re-engagement with the Court's
majority. Justice Breyer concludes this section of the book by accusing the majority of
reading the controlling texts "too literally"."3 In a similar vein, Justice Breyer opens his
treatment of the Court's Medellin case with a discussion of the dissenting opinion,3 ' which
he ultimately acknowledges as his work, with the qualification that "naturally, since I
wrote [it], I am persuaded by its reasoning" 32 Justice Breyer only reluctantly concludes,

Ibid.
Peter Russell, "Judicial Free Speech: Justifiable Limits", University of New Brunswick Law Journal, XLV (1996),
p. 159.
20 Bartie and Gava, note 15 above, p. 640.
21
Smyth, note 16 above, p. 201.
2
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012).
23
Breyer, note 1 above, p. 23.
24
Ibid.
18

1

25

26

Ibid.

2

Ibid. pp. 23-24.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
Breyer, note 1 above, pp. 205-210.

29

Ibid.

21

30
31
32

Ibid.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
Breyer, note 1 above, p. 215.
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however, that it would be more important "to consider the significance of [the majority]
opinion"." Elsewhere in the book Justice Breyer re-examines his concurring opinion in the
Kiobel case.3 4
The fact that Justice Breyer uses the book to reconsider and explain the cases in which
he was involved - including the repackaging of his dissenting opinions - leads to the
question about motive that was posed by Bartie and Gava in their commentary on extrajudicial scholarship. "Why", they ask, "should judges want to publicly communicate their
position on points of law outside of judgements"?" This is a fair question. Justice Breyer
does not address it in the book. The issue merits greater attention from scholars and critics.
THE BOOK: TO COMPARE OR NOT TO COMPARE?
Background
Justice Breyer has emerged as an advocate for a pragmatic and flexible interpretive
approach that fits neatly with his vision of a "living" constitution that "actively" secures
liberty. 6 This means he has often found himself opposed to the Court's justices who favor
more formalistic - Justice Breyer might call it "categorical" - interpretive approaches
and who have a more static constitutional vision." Justice Breyer is associated with the
"progressive" or "liberal" block of justices on the Court by those who like to reduce the
complexities of judicial reasoning to such banal dichotomies." His best-known opinions
have been dissents in cases such as Bush v. Gore (2000) (settling the contested 2000
presidential election in favor of George Bush); Ashcroft v. ACLU (2002) (upholding an
40
injunction against the implementation of a law criminalizing Internet child pornography);
and D.C. v. Heller (2008) (finding that the Second Amendment provides an individual right
to own and possess firearms for self-defense). 4 1 Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion
42
in Stenberg v. Carhart(2000) (finding Nebraska's restrictive abortion law unconstitutional)
and in U.S. v. Comstock (2010) (upholding a federal law providing for post-incarceration
civil commitments of sexual offenders). 4 3
Justice Breyer's opinion in Comstock is representative of his interpretive approach and
constitutional vision." He might have reached the same result in the case by relying on the

"

Ibid.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). See Breyer, note 1 above, pp. 157-160.
Bartie and Gava, note 14 above, pp. 641-642.
3
See, for example, Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (2006); Stephen
Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work:A Judge's View (2010).
1
See, for example, Breyer, note 1 above, p. 259.
38
See, for example, Sarah Almukhtar, "Why Obama Nominated Merrick Garland for the Supreme Court",
New York Times, 16 March 2016 (referring to a study that places Justice Breyer in the cluster of "liberal" justices
on the Court, albeit as the least liberal of the duster). See also Hannah Fairfield and Adam Liptak, "A More
Nuanced Breakdown of the Supreme Court", New York Times, 26 June 2014.
* Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
o Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
41 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
42
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
* United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
"
See Breyer, note 36 above. See also Garrett Epps, American Justice 2014: Nine Clashing Visions on the Supreme
Court (2014); Richard J. Price, Jr., "Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist", Administrative Law
Journal of theAmerican University, VIII (1994-1995), p. 747.
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traditional but formalistic interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause (which gives
Congress the "necessary and proper" power to enact law in the fields of its enumerated
competences). 5 Instead, Justice Breyer applied a more flexible, multi-part test to uphold
the civil commitment statute.4 6 The newly-crafted test is conscious of the pragmatic
consequences (for a number of stakeholders) of the decision it is meant to produce.4 7 And it
involves the Court in an effort to fairly balance those consequences against the challenged
law's aims.4 8 It is an approach that signals the strong impression that proportionality
analysis has made on Justice Breyer, a point he raises in his new book.49
The fact that Breyer is also widely regarded as the most cosmopolitan justice on the
Supreme Court makes this book meaningful for comparative lawyers. Alongside his
degrees from Stanford (B.A.) and Harvard (LL.B.), he earned an Oxford B.A. as a Marshall
Scholar. He has profound personal ties abroad. And he is reputedly fluent in French. But
his decisions as a justice at the Supreme Court provide the more compelling evidence of his
strong interest in what he refers to as the "transnational or multinational judicial enterprise"
that is part of the Court's new reality. 0 Justice Breyer authored or joined many opinions
of the last decade that made comparative references to non-United States legal sources.5
He did so most prominently in a dissenting opinion in Printz v. U.S. (1997) (finding that
a federal law requiring administrative action from state law enforcement officers to be a
violation of the Constitution's federalism provisions).5 2 Justice Breyer referred to European
and German administrative federalism as evidence that the challenged law envisioned a
workable and not-objectionable scheme." This interpretive maneuver attracted a stinging
rebuke in a footnote to the majority's opinion, in which Justice Scalia cautioned: "We think
such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though
it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one".54
This skirmish - "to compare or not to compare" - became the dominant narrative
in American comparative constitutional law over the last decades. It seeped into other
decisions and into the public commentary of both justices." It is the clear - but strangely
unspoken - background to Justice Breyer's new book.

4

See, for example, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
Ibid.
Ibid.

49

Breyer, note 1 above, pp. 254-262.

*
47

Ibid., p. 6

51

See, for example, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roper v.

.

5o

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Ibid. See Daniel Halberstam, "Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering", in Kalypso
Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds.), The FederalVision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and
52
5

the European Union (2001), p. 213.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, n. 11 (1997).
See, for example, Justices Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, & Stephen Breyer, Assoc.
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Discussion at the American University Washington College of Law: Constitutional
Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (13 January 2005), http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel;
"The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation between Justice
Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer", International Journal of Constitutional Law, III (2005), p. 519;
Cornel Marian, "Learning from Others: The Scalia-Breyer Debate and the Benefits of Foreign Sources of Law
to U.S. Constitutional Interpretation of Counter-Terrorism Initiatives", Vienna Online Journal on International
ConstitutionalLaw, IV (2010), p. 5. See also Stephen Breyer, "After September 11 - National and International
54
5

Legal Tasks", Experience, XX (2010), p. 29.
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The Book's Agenda
Justice Breyer wants to empirically document the fact that "as a matter of unavoidable
reality, the Court is engaged with the world"." To this end, the book presents cases from
the Court's docket that required the justices to interact with representatives of foreign
governments, to interact with foreign lawyers, and to interact with and be conscious of the
effects their decisions would have on non-Americans. This is not a new phenomenon." But
Justice Breyer is convinced that it is now more frequent and intense as a by-product of our
"ever more interdependent world-a world of instant communications and commerce,
and shared problems ... , all of which ever more pervasively link individuals without
regard to national boundaries"." He arranges the cases, which he offers as proof of this
development, into three broad categories: national security issues, statutory interpretation,
and treaty interpretation.
For most readers - living in our globalized world - the notion will almost seem selfevident. Why would Justice Breyer feel the need to document the obvious trend towards
globalization at the Court? He has two normative claims that motivate this descriptive
project, both of which engage with the exceptionalist tradition in American constitutional
law that has presented such significant barriers to comparatism and cosmopolitanism at
the Court specifically and in American jurisprudence generally. This is well-documented
and intensely-debated story that does not need to be told again here." Indeed, Justice
Breyer also does not map the entrenched battle-lines for his readers. He can take it for
granted that everyone understands that his normative claims in the book are part of that
controversy.
The first normative position, which Justice Breyer develops more fully in the book, is the
pragmatic point that the Court's new globalized reality will require the justices to become
competent comparative lawyers. This, he explains, will facilitate their "understanding of,
and working relationships with, foreign courts and legal institutions".60 It will permit them
to "understand and appropriately apply international and foreign law".61 This would be
controversial enough in America. To soften the expected exceptionalist-rejoinder Justice
Breyer frames this less as a choice than as a necessary consequence of the undeniably
globalized jurisprudential reality that he describes in the book. Comparative law scholars
will welcome this effort. But there are pangs of regret. His resort to a strictly practical
justification detracts from our discipline's other promises, including the ways in which
comparative law promotes justice, social understanding, and cultural sensitivity.

56

5

Breyer, note 1 above, p. 6.

See, for example, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).

Breyer, note 1 above, p. 4.
5 See, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, "On American Exceptionalism", Stanford Law Review, LV (20022003), p. 1479; Oscar G. Chase, "American Exceptionalism and Comparative Procedure", American Journal of
Comparative Law, L (2002), p. 277; M. Ignatieff (ed.), American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (2005); Miguel
Schor, "Judicial Review and American Constitutional Exceptionalism", Osgoode Hall Law Journal, XLVI (2008),
p. 535; Peter S. Onuf, "American Exceptionalism and National Identity", American PoliticalThought, 1 (2012), p.
77; Mila Versteeg and Emily Zacklin, "American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited", University of Chicago
58

Law Review, LXXXI (2014), p. 1641.
60
61

Breyer, note 1 above, p. 7.
Ibid.
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The second normative position, with which Justice Breyer less-comprehensively
engages, is the narrower question of the propriety of the Supreme Court's use of "crossreferences" to foreign law. This should be Justice Breyer's thoughtful response to the
long-running debate over comparative cross-references at the Court, and it impresses as
the book's most sensational possibility. Justice Breyer acknowledges this, noting that the
Court's rare and modest references to the decisions of foreign courts has occupied "the
foreground in political discussions about the role of foreign law" in the United States.6 2 As
I noted above, this modest practice has been the epicenter of the debate over foreign law
in judicial and jurisprudential discussions in America. But even while the book cannot be
anything other than Justice Breyer's contribution to that debate, he wants to argue that
the attention given to this issue is out of proportion to its significance. It has minimal
relevance and its significance is receding relative to the Court's expanding and deepening
pragmatic encounters with the world, which Justice Breyer documents in the book. "The
critics' concerns about judicial references to foreign law", he concludes, "are beside the
point".6 Curiously, all that Justice Breyer can manage with respect to this fundamental
issue is to urge - or offer a defense of - the practice at a few points throughout the book
and in a ten page "postscript" that concludes the book.64
The ambivalence with which Justice Breyer engages this big - omnipresent - issue
is what left me thinking of Hamlet. Opposition to comparative references in the Court's
jurisprudence stalks and haunts the project like the ghost of King Hamlet in Shakespeare's
play (a metaphor made sadly more poignant by Justice Scalia's death). The whole affair,
then, should be about where Justice Breyer stands on the question, and this book is his
chance to articulate a clear manifesto in support of the practice. But he does not take that
path.
I have never been happy that comparative law, in its broader reception in America,
was reduced to this narrow and questionable role in Supreme Court interpretive practice.
Comparative law is more than a modest "empirical" or "positive" side glance in a handful
of the Court's most controversial decisions.6" Particularly troubling is the poor quality of the
comparative endeavor as practiced in this mode.66 The methodological deficiencies of the
Court's comparative law fairly justify some of the criticism this has attracted and should,
at least, counsel caution in the use of that kind of comparative law. Justice Breyer even
acknowledges the merit of some of the "not entirely unfounded" arguments against the
practice." For these reasons it is pleasing to see that Justice Breyer seeks to draw attention
away from this marginal and problematic iteration of the discipline - largely by neglecting
it - despite its predominance in scholarly debate and in the public consciousness.
Or does he? It is, after all, the unspoken controversy that justifies the book. And,
although he mostly avoids the issue, Justice Breyer nonetheless advocates for the practice
of comparative cross-references in the book's short "postscript". But much like Prince

62
63
64

Ibid., p. 236.

Ibid., p. 244.
Ibid., pp. 80-87, 236-246.

61

See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Introduction", American Journal of Comparative Law, XX (1972), p. 585; id, "A
Decent Respect to the Opinions of Humankind: The Value of Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication", American Society of InternationalLaw Proceedings,XCIX (2005), p. 351.
66
See Halberstam, note 53, above.
67
Breyer, note 1 above, p. 239.
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Hamlet, Justice Breyer equivocates. He denies the importance of the debate while offering
a dithering defense of the practice. He almost wants to say that the entire book - especially
its empirical project - is an argument for the unavoidable necessity of that kind of
comparative law. But he does not say this. And in any case, necessity is not an affirmative
theoretical frame for comparative law. Justice Breyer merely concludes that comparative
references "can be of help in understanding the commands of American" law.68 Why
would such insight have that effect? He does not say. Methodologically, Justice Breyer
merely embraces comparative law's functionalism,69 arguing that Americans and foreign
jurists have much in common: "They confront similar problems. They perform the same
kinds of judicial tasks following similar charters offering similar protections to democratic
government and to individual human rights. American and foreign judges furthermore
have the same desire - as well as requisite experience - to advance the rule of law even as
the world threatens to become more turbulent"." I disapprove of this entrenched approach
to comparative law, not the least because its superficiality plays so effectively into the
hands of the discipline's skeptics. It is disappointing that, considering all that is at stake in
this controversy and the prominence of his contributions to it, that Justice Breyer did not
articulate a more comprehensive theory and method of comparative law, especially as it
might be practiced by courts.
To compare or not to compare? And, how or when to compare? Those were incontestably
the questions animating the book. But Justice Breyer does not want to answer them.
The Book's Content
Instead Justice Breyer throws himself into the first of his two normative projects, which
is to document the increasing "foreign" or "international" demands on the Supreme
Court. Justice Breyer surveys the Court's work in a handful of areas, including national
security law, statutory interpretation, and treaty interpretation. In each of these areas he
effectively demonstrates the ways in which the Court's cases now bring it into contact with
the wider world. It is not obvious, however, that these global encounters (at least partially
attributed to America's role as a preeminent military and economic power) require
increased comparative or international law competence from the Court. Most of the cases
he describes can be resolved exclusively by reference to the law of the United States or do
not require greater transnationalism from the Court's justices than they already exhibit.
This seems particularly true with respect to Justice Breyer's discussion of national
security law, which only provides evidence of "interdependence" with respect to the facts
involved in the cases. The cases he discusses, including old and new classics in the area
that Americans sometimes refer to as the "foreign relations law of the United States","

68

Ibid., p. 240.

69 See, for example, Konrad Zweigert and Hein K6tz, An Introduction to ComparativeLaw, transl. Tony Weir (3d
ed.; 1998).
0

Breyer, note 1 above, p. 249 (emphasis added).
See, for example, Michael Traynor, "The Future of Foreign Relations Law of the United States", Southwestern
Journal of InternationalLaw, XVIII (2011), p. 5; Jack L. Goldsmith, "The New Formalism in United States Foreign
Relations Law", University of Colorado Law Review, LXX (1999), p. 1395; Richard A. Falk, "Law, Lawyers, and
the Conduct of American Foreign Relations", Yale Law Journal, LXXVIII (1968-1969), ,p. 919; Louis Henkin,
"Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations", University ofPennsylvania
71

Law Review, CVII (1958-1959), p. 903.
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demonstrate the many "ways - both good and bad - in which foreign actors and activity
enter into our national life and create problems we share with other nations" .72 But the
cases to which Justice Breyer refers are resolved, almost exclusively, by reference to
American law - usually as a matter of the checks-and-balances that uniquely distinguish
the American doctrine of separation of powers. The structural components of constitutional
law are sometimes regarded as the least susceptible to comparative influence. In fact,
Justice Breyer engages at length with some issues that are distinctive to the constitutional
law of the United States, such as the political question doctrine.7 ' The comparative law
dimension of these domestic law questions, Justice Breyer tells us in the chapter's last
few pages, is the possible "constructive examples" other systems can provide from their
judicial confrontations with the "same" problems.7 4 Justice Breyer briefly mentions the
United Kingdom, Israel, and Spain as potential points of reference that suggest solutions
to the problems America faces.7 ' He tells us that these countries have detention policies
from which America might learn as it confronts the threats that led to the establishment of
the Guantanamo Bay detention camp.76 But he does not explain why these countries would
provide useful insight. Worse than that, Justice Breyer overlooks profound differences that
might confound their comparative value for thinking about the power of the President
of the United States. All three are parliamentary regimes, for example. Two of them (the
United Kingdom and Israel) do not have written constitutions. Two are subject to the robust
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of that regime's active court.
None contributes to the maintenance of the global order as the United States does. These
are points his functionalist approach to comparative law allows him to ignore or elide, but
they are relevant, not least because they are the kinds of distinctions his opponents will
assert when questioning the integrity of his case selection for his comparative references.
Ultimately, Justice Breyer fails to establish that familiarity with international and foreign
law is increasingly necessary for resolving American constitutional law questions about
the President's executive and war-time powers.
In the area of statutory interpretation Justice Breyer identifies a distinct transnational
problem across a number of legislative regimes: the geographical scope of American
statutes within the broadly-interconnected legal web in which we now find ourselves.
Justice Breyer claims to have identified an emerging trend, across several fields, that
suggests the Supreme Court's deepening globalism." We are witnessing a revival of the
venerable doctrine of comity. Justice Breyer explains that "our Court has increasingly
sought interpretations of domestic law that would allow it to work in harmony with related
foreign laws, so that together they can more effectively achieve common objectives" .71 Yet

Breyer, note 1 above, p. 81.
' See, for example, Donald P. Kommers and Russell A. Miller, The ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof the Federal
Republic of Germany (31d ed.; 2012), p. 68 ("Alexander Bickel maintained that the U.S. Supreme Court is often at
its best when it declines to exercise jurisdiction it clearly has. These evasive strategies, which he calls 'passive
virtues,' include rules on standing, case and controversy requirements, the political question doctrine, and
other prudential techniques for avoiding constitutional controversies. There are no exact equivalents to these
rules in Germany").
7'
Breyer, note 1 above, pp. 80-87.
7
Ibid.
72

76
7
7

Ibid.
Including antitrust law, securities law, intellectual property law, and human rights law.
Breyer, note 1 above, p. 92.
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it goes too far to characterize the Court's passivity and restraint as an affirmative and
active effort to globally "harmonize" law. But it does show the Court's sensitivity towards
what Justice Breyer refers to as the world's fragile cooperative legal infrastructure.
Justice Breyer demonstrates in the antitrust context, as well as in his discussion of the
Alien Tort Statute, that the doctrinal basis for the Court's restraint is the well-established
presumption against extraterritoriality, which obliges the Court to avoid interpretations
of the law that would lead to unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of
others." Thus, in the Empagran case the Court refused to extend the Sherman Antitrust
Act to injuries occurring in foreign commerce and when the adverse effects of collusive
activity appear only in foreign contexts. 0 Similarly, Justice Breyer sees the Court's recent,
restrictive interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute, also involving the presumption against
extraterritoriality, as evidence of the Court's desire to avoid international discord and
show respect for other countries' efforts at protecting human rights." The Court's strategic
and subtle restraint in these cases, Justice Breyer argues, is proof that it takes into account
the international consequences of its decisions and that it must be familiar with foreign
law and practices.82 To the degree that the latter is true, however, the Court's engagement
with foreign law and practices serves mainly to prompt the Court to interpret American
statutes in a way that allows it to avoid conflict with foreign law. These passive encounters
are not the same thing as a robust transnational jurisprudence because they do not require
the Court to consider foreign law for the formal resolution of these cases, which are still
strictly decided under the terms of American law.
At last we get a taste of a more substantive form of legal interdependence in the chapter
on the Court's interpretation of international agreements. Here Justice Breyer can show the
Court engaging directly with non-domestic law as the rule of decision in its cases, including
the Court's interpretation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, bilateral investment treaties, the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the case of the Hague Convention,
Justice Breyer scores twice because he notes that the Convention reduces everything to
"custody", which, in turn, "will depend on the laws and practices of a foreign country"."
This is international law requiring the Court to engage with foreign law. This material
seems best-suited to supporting the book's normative agenda. But Justice Breyer moves
even more cautiously here than he does elsewhere in the book. For example, he merely
predicts the increasing relevance for the Court of investment treaty arbitration cases.8 4
With respect to the direct effect of international agreements (and any accompanying
international court decisions) he embraces piecemeal Congressional action - not judicial
decision-making (and the Court's practice of comparative law) - as a way of incorporating
the agreements into American law." Concerning delegations of law-making authority to
international authorities, Justice Breyer concedes that the Court has said little and that the
hard work on the issue is yet to be done." He sees all of these emerging developments as
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further proof that the Court and the legal profession will have "to understand legal and
practical realities elsewhere in the world" .17 But the most that can be said on the evidence
he presents is that we will have to wait and see.
CONCLUSION
Justice Breyer's book definitively disposes of an extreme isolationist fantasy about
American constitutional law and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. But this was
never the point of the critics of transnationalism at the Court. Even Justice Scalia would
not shrink from treaty interpretation when the law of the case required it of him." And
the Supreme Court has always been conscious of the foreign implications - both direct
and indirect - of its work." The harder question posed by American exceptionalism for
comparative constitutional law is the extent to which decisions of the Supreme Court
should be resolved in the light of foreign or international law when it would otherwise
be possible to rely exclusively on American precedent. Justice Breyer mostly dodges this
burning issue, except for some brief remarks in the book's postscript in which he takes
a page from Anne Marie Slaughter's network thesis to suggest that the practice is now
unavoidable because the justices of the world's apex courts are increasingly in contact
with one another and with a global cohort of legal scholars and law students.0 Justice
Breyer offers his dawning appreciation for European-style proportionality analysis as an
example of the way these encounters have influenced his thinking (is this what he was up
to in Comstock?).' He hopes, in any case, that the Supreme Court's embrace of comparative
92
law will allow it to contribute to the global spread of the principle of the rule of law.
The book may miss Justice Breyer's more modest normative agenda. But it is certain that
he does not tackle the main theme that seems to animate the book and which preoccupies
the comparative law discipline. Justice Breyer's avoidance - except for a few summary
points - of the big question stalking the book will neither satisfy the critics (for whom
the real concerns are excessive judicial power and discretion) nor boost the comparatists
(who are still looking for the strong, theoretical defense of comparative cross-references
by the Court). On the one hand, the book does not offer a clear answer to the critics'
concerns about an expansion of the Court's interpretive repertoire to include undisciplined
empirical insights from foreign law." On the other hand, the book's brief treatment of the
big question will not quiet concerns about the elitist, unaccountable cosmopolitanism that
lurks behind some parts of the comparative law project.
The book that authoritatively grapples with the question of the Supreme Court's resort
to comparative side-glances when deciding its cases still needs to be written. Justice Breyer
is the obvious person to write it. As wise old Lord Polonius might have said: "Lights,
lights, get us some lights!"94
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